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WHAT MACHINE PHILOSOPHY ISN’T
Abstract. This short paper clears up three misunderstandings about machine philosophy. First,
machine philosophy does not demand computational or formal philosophy. Instead, it only
calls for a grounding of philosophical theorising in statistical learning, not that philosophy
must proceed by means of statistical learning. Second, machine philosophy does not entail the
collapse of metaphysics. In fact, it doesn’t affect metaphysics more than any other philosophical
field. Third, while machine philosophy potentially entails the illegitimacy of widely discussed
philosophical problems, this consideration isn’t a worry for machine philosophy.
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1. What is Machine Philosophy
Machine philosophy is a methodological foundation for doing philosophy. It proposes
that philosophical theorising be epistemically grounded on statistical principles, and
thereby continuous with the physical sciences. For this end, machine philosophy entails
a stance on philosophical data, and the activity of theorising over this data. Agreeing
with standard practice, machine philosophy treats intuitions as the primary source of
philosophical evidence. However, instead of taking them as either a priori evidence
about physical reality, or as outright pseudo-evidence, machine philosophy treats intu-
itions as fallible evidence, which reflect objective facts about our socio-linguistic reali-
ties. As for theorising, machine philosophy rejects standard boolean attitudes, which
it sees as the key culprit for the methodological anarchy in philosophy. In particular,
boolean argumentations such as using reductio ad absurdum have led to descriptivists
to adopt an overly cautious take against statistical bias in theorising, which has in turn
led to overfitting.2 The standard response to this is a boolean one—to treat philoso-
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2Strawson (1963) raised the original point against revision in philosophy. Post-Gettier epistemology
is a manifestation of this attitude.
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phy as normative.3 Machine philosophy rejects this false dichotomy, by replacing the
boolean attitude with a fundamentally statistical one. In this capacity, philosophical
theories are descriptive of our socio-linguistic realities in virtue of being statistically
adequate models of our intuitions. In this capacity, philosophical theorising should
revise over our intuitions, with the goal of producing true theories.
2. Relating to Computational or Formal Philosophy
First, machine philosophy doesn’t entail computational philosophy. Computational
philosophy is the methodology of applying computational methods to philosophical
problems. Examples include using agent based modelling (ABMs) to study moral
norms or social epistemological problems.4 These have indeed worked quite well. How-
ever, machine philosophy simply calls for philosophical theorising to be governed by
statistical norms, and provides a foundation for doing so. As a result, philosophical
problems could lend themselves to computational solutions. However, machine phi-
losophy does not entail that philosophers should use computational methods. After
all, scientific theorising as we know it had been practised even before computational
methods became feasible.
Second, machine philosophy does not entail formal philosophy. This is analogous to
machine philosophy’s relation to computational philosophy. Machine philosophy sim-
ply claims that philosophical methodology should shift from a priori, boolean reasoning
to statistical methods like in the sciences. This does not itself entail that philosophers
should use only formal methods. Again, scientists doesn’t exclusively engage in statis-
tical modelling, even if their reasoning are ultimately grounded on statistical norms.
Similarly, mathematicians don’t generally do first-order logic, even if the foundations
of mathematics grounds mathematical propositions in set-theoretic terms. However,
machine philosophy does entail that philosophers should strive to be as statistically
fine-grained as feasible. This means that, whenever a more refined statistical method
3This stance can be traced back to explication in Carnap (1950), and the defence of it against Strawson
in Carnap (1963). For a contemporary summary of the revisionist attitude, see Cappelen (2018). Also
in Cappelen, it has been noted that there isn’t a clear line between so-called descriptivist (Strawsonians)
and revisionists. Jackson (1998) is a prime example of this fuzziness. Machine philosophy is in a sense,
a clarification of the Jacksonian sentiment and the Carnapian project.
4Goldman (2010) had laid the groundwork for using ABMs to study social-epistemological problems
by setting out a system for social-epistemological settings with the parameters: choices; agent; evidence;
norms. Mayo-Wilson (2014) uses ABMs of research networks to study the reliability of testimonial
norms in scientific communities. Zollman (2010) uses network structures in ABMs to study the social
epistemological problem of communication. These studies have been done in NetLogo, a high level
language specifically designed for building ABMs. See also Weisberg, Muldoon (2009); Mayo-Wilson,
Zollman, Danks (2011). In ethics, Skyrms (2003, 2010) laid the groundwork by building a game-theoretic
framework to account for cooperation. We have examples such as Alexander (2007) and Muldoon,
Hartmann (2014), who used ABMs to study how moral norms can evolve out of basic game-theoretic
norms.
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is available, the philosopher shouldn’t settle on less refined methods. If it’s possible for
a particular philosophical question to be answered by a machine learning model, there
is no reason for us to stop at the archaic procedure of linguistic or conceptual analysis.
This does not meant that we cannot start with simple analysis, just that we should also
use the more advanced methods in addition, in order to refine our theorising. More-
over, there is absolutely no reason to assume that we need a lot of data to do machine
philosophy well—the intuitions that we have considered in the literature are perfectly
fine.5 This is neither a pleasantry nor an annoyance, it’s merely what scientists have
been doing for quite a while.
3. On the Issue of Metaphysics
Metaphysicians often think of their theories as being about the mind-independent
world, and intuitions are a priori evidence of that. Machine philosophy considers
intuitions to be empirical facts about our socio-linguistic reality. So it seems that
metaphysics has no place in machine philosophy. However, this would be a misunder-
standing on several levels.
First, it would be an equivocation on ‘about’ as an epistemic relation of grounding
with ‘about’ as a linguistic relation of reference. Intuitions are epistemically grounded
in our socio-linguistic realities. However, they refer to the external world. Intuitions
are ultimately about our categorisations of entities in the world. Observations are
likewise not as ‘objective’ as one might like to believe.6 Pointing out that intuitions
are community-dependent (as observations are) is a call for modesty, not a rejection of
the ability for philosophers to study the mind-independent world.
Second, whether our intuitions refer to our socio-linguistic realities or the physical
reality has no bearing on the truth of metaphysical propositions. If metaphysicians
5Moreover, we have a ML technique ‘Less Than One’-Shot Learning from Sucholutsky, Schonlau
(2020). This technique is much more data efficient than previously thought possible for statistical
learning. It allows statistical learning to effectively generalise on what we might think of as anecdotal
data. This is good news for philosophers, as we’d rather sit in our armchair than do corpus studies.
6Proietti et. al (2019) has experimentally realised Wigner’s thought experiment from Wigner
(1961) where two observers experience irreconcilable realities at the quantum level. Granted, observer-
dependent evidence need not entail observer-dependent quantum theories, since either locality or statis-
tical independence could be violated by quantum mechanics, as demonstrated in Hensen et. al (2015).
However, the point stands that we cannot in general assume observer-independency for observational
evidence. Moreover, the point of the experiment wasn’t that observations are observer-dependent, this
is trivial (via being theory-laden). The point was that observer-dependency could be a feature of the
measured reality rather than human quirks (including our beliefs etc.). This reinforces the QBist reading
of quantum mechanics (and Proietti et al. support this view) where the very target of a quantum theory
just is the reality as experienced by an observer. However, it does not entail anti-realism. In fact, the
experiment demonstrates the opposite: the reality that exists as we know it may be necessarily observer
dependent as a matter of physical reality. Since intuitions are trivially observer-dependent in virtue of
having no obvious external reference, we need not delve further into this point.
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insist that their subject matter is the mind-independent world, they’re free to do so—
so long as they do not treat their metaphysical intuitions as infallible boolean evidence,
and so long as they try their best to theorise in accord with statistical principles.
Third, what matters for philosophical theorising (not just metaphysics) isn’t about
the ‘mind-dependencies’ of our subject matters, but their objectivity. Intuitions, like
observations, are necessarily observer-dependent and theory-laden. There is a trivial
sense in which all of our data are ‘mind-dependent’. However, that has no bearing on
whether the evidence is objective. The relevant sense of objectivity for theories is the
existence of objective criteria for measuring the truth of a theory. For intuitions, this
criteria is a combination of expert agreement and statistical significance, much like for
observations. What matters is that our theories aren’t idiosyncratic, not whether the
truth of a theory is domain-bound.
4. On the Issue of Legitimate Philosophical Problems
One consequence of machine philosophy is that certain traditional philosophical issues
that are grounded on boolean considerations might become illegitimate. For example,
Cartesian considerations of epistemic certainty becomes inoculated once we no longer
think of justification as boolean. However, there seems to be plenty of philosophers
who take many traditional philosophical issues very seriously. One might argue that
this latter fact constitutes a counterexample to machine philosophy. This objection
has four fatal flaws.
First, there’s the division within philosophy. Already, many philosophical problems
have been abandoned by philosophers,7 and it isn’t a worry for these people that some
traditional philosophical problems aren’t solvable or well-formed. Just because a lot of
people cared about phlogiston or aether doesn’t make them genuine scientific topics.
Second, machine philosophy isn’t supposed to describe what philosophers actually
do. So the fact that a lot of people actually tackle certain problems isn’t the relevant
data. Machine philosophy tries to describe what proper philosophy looks like.
Third, machine philosophy isn’t as radical as it might first appear. So long a
problem is solvable by scientific methods, it’s a real philosophical problem. I suspect
that many of the active problems are solvable, just that we need to abandon boolean
ways of tackling them. Of course, I don’t know exactly how many problems that
philosophers work on are rendered nonsensical by machine philosophy and I’m aware
that my proposal may look quite radical. Nonetheless, I see it as a natural and necessary
step in the progress of philosophical methodology. If some folks have a tough time
accepting that, it’s not my concern to convince them, just as is my indifference to the
strong voices of flat-earthers.
7E.g. Bayesian, machine, or function-first epistemology abandoning the Gettier issues. See Bovens,
Hartmann (2003), Wheeler (2016), Hannon (2019).
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Finally, even if the structure of this modus tollens argument is legitimate, machine
philosophy begins with the goal of producing true propositions, and thereby epistemic
rigour in the service of truth, rather than being held hostage by some ungrounded
theoretical concerns like the Strawsonian attitude, into which both the conceptual
engineers and analysts have inadvertently bought.
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